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I DREAM OF GINA: UNDERSTANDING THE EMPLOYMENT
PROVISIONS OF THE GENETIC INFORMATION
NONDISCRIMINATION ACT OF 2008
WILLIAM J. McDEvIT-r, ESQ.*
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE news could not have been more devastating. Sarah had recon-
ciled herself to the untimely death of her brother. His drinking prob-
lem over the past few years, as well as his general disinterest in taking care
of his basic needs, surely led to his downward spiraling health and, ulti-
mately, his demise in a sterile intensive care unit. But she could not un-
derstand why the doctor had ordered a genetic test upon his death. What
did the doctor suspect that no one else saw?
The test results came back: her brother had a faulty gene on chromo-
some 4, the marker for Huntington's disease.' This explained his involun-
tary shakes, weight loss, and difficulty speaking, and it also may have
explained his rather quick demise as the organs in his body shut down.2
Even more disturbing and frightening, the positive test result meant that
Sarah and her siblings had a fifty percent chance of developing the disease
themselves, not to mention the children of those among her brothers and
sisters who had also tested positive. 3 In addition, if Sarah herself had
tested positive-and if her employer discovered that she had-she stood a
good chance of being fired from her well-paying job.4
While the foregoing is only a hypothetical scenario, its implications
are all too real. Sarah's fears were neither feigned nor fanciful. There
currently is no effective, clear legal prohibition against employment dis-
* Associate Professor of Management, Saint Joseph's University in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The author received a B.A. degree in 1972 from the
University of Notre Dame and a J.D. degree from Villanova University School of
Law in 1975.
1. See HUNTINGTON'S DISEASE ASs'N, GENERAL INFORMATION ABOUT HUNTING-
TON'S DISEASE, Fact Sheet 2 (2008), available at http://ww.hda.org.uk/download/fact-
sheets/HD-Huntingtons-Disease.pdf (explaining cause of Huntington's disease).
2. See id. (describing symptoms that occur as disease progresses).
3. See id. ("Each person whose parent has Huntington's disease is born with a
50:50 chance of inheriting the faulty gene."). Although genetic testing will indi-
cate whether individuals have inherited the faulty gene, testing will not be able to
determine the age at which they will develop Huntington's disease. See id.
(describing limits of genetic test for Huntington's disease).
4. See generally Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic Discrimination:
Old Responses to New Technology, 74 B.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994) ("The advent of such
genetic information creates the fear that this knowledge will be turned against
those with undesirable conditions.").
(91)
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crimination on the basis of genetic information or defects, outside of em-
ployment with the federal government.
5
Prior legislation designed to end discrimination in the workplace, in-
cluding the Civil Rights Act of 19646 and the Americans With Disabilities
Act of 1990 (ADA) ,7 does not specifically address employment discrimina-
tion based on genetic information. Despite intending the ADA to provide
a comprehensive scheme of protection against discrimination on the basis
of disability, legislators drafted the ADA at a time when our understanding
of genetics, as well as our ability to detect and predict disorders stemming
from genetics, was in its infancy. Congress recognized that this lack of
understanding at the time of the ADA's passage resulted in a deficiency in
protection against discrimination on the basis of individuals' genetic
makeup. Congress has attempted to remedy this deficiency in protection
by passing the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008
(GINA) .8
This Article analyzes the deficiencies in federal law that precipitated
Congress's passage of GINA, and offers a detailed explanation of GINA's
provisions. Part II explains how genetic information can be used to dis-
criminate against employees. 9 Part III explores Congress's intent to in-
clude genetic defects within the protections provided by the ADA.10 Part
IV reviews how, despite Congress's intent, the language of the ADA fails to
take into account various scenarios under which employees can face ge-
netic discrimination.11 Part V provides an overview of GINA, which is de-
signed to protect employees from discrimination based on their genome
more definitively than the ADA.12 Finally, Part VI identifies several con-
gressional compromises made in the course of drafting GINA, and dis-
cusses the potential impact of these compromises in subsequent
applications of the new legislation. 13
5. See Exec. Order No. 13,145, 3 C.F.R. 235 (2001), reprinted in 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-1 (b) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination, based on protected genetic infor-
mation, against federal government employees).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006).
8. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233,
122 Stat. 881 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff to 2000ff-ll). GINA will take
effect on November 21, 2009, eighteen months after its enactment. See id. § 213
(listing statute's effective date).
9. For an account of how employers can use genetic information to discrimi-
nate against employees, see infra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
10. For an analysis of Congress's intent that the protections of the ADA apply
to individuals with genetic defects, see infra notes 31-43 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the ADA's inability to extend to several possible scena-
rios of genetic discrimination, see infra notes 44-88 and accompanying text.
12. For a comprehensive overview of GINA, see infra notes 89-131 and accom-
panying text.
13. For a discussion of the compromises Congress made in order to ensure
enactment of GINA, see infra notes 13240 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 54: p. 91
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II. GENETICS AND DISCRIMINATION
A. A Primer on Genetics
A human being is an "organism," which means that it is composed of
various organs such as the heart, brain, liver, kidney, hair, and skin. The
organs, in turn, are made up of cells. Each cell contains a "nucleus" which
houses genetic material. The genetic material is stored in thread-like
structures called "chromosomes."14
A human being has twenty-three pairs of chromosomes in each cell,
for a total of forty-six chromosomes.' 5 These chromosomes hold our
genes. 16 A "gene" is a unit of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) that carries
the instructions for making a specific protein or set of proteins. 17 A
human being is made up of an estimated 20,000 to 25,000 genes.18
Collectively, all of an individual's genes are known as that individual's
"genome." I9 Each gene within a genome is responsible for a particular
function or trait, such as hair color and blood type.20 These same genes,
however, can cause serious or fatal diseases or conditions when they are
abnormal or defective. 21
B. Employer Discrimination on the Basis of Genetics
The question arises: Should employers be allowed to discriminate
against job applicants or employees based upon their individual genetic
14. See National Human Genome Research Institute, Chromosomes, http://
www.genome.gov/26524120 (last visited Nov. 18, 2008) (providing definition of
chromosome).
15. See id. (providing number of chromosomes in humans). By comparison, a
fruit fly has four pairs of chromosomes, whereas a dog has thirty-nine. See id. (com-
paring number of chromosomes in humans to number of chromosomes in other
species).
16. See National Human Genome Research Institute, Chromosome Abnor-
malities, http://www.genome.gov/11508982 (last visited Nov. 18, 2008) (describ-
ing chromosomes' function).
17. See National Human Genome Research Institute, A Brief Guide to Ge-
nomics, http://www.genome.gov/18016863 (last visited Nov. 18, 2008) (defining
"gene").
18. See id. (estimating number of genes in human genome).
19. See National Human Genome Research Institute, An Overview of the
Human Genome Project, http://www.genome.gov/12011238 (last visited Nov. 18,
2008) (defining "genome").
20. See Chromosomes Abnormalities, supra note 16 (describing chromo-
somes' specific function).
21. See Kristie A. Deyerle, Comment, Genetic Testing in the Workplace: Employer
Dream, Employee Nightmare-Legislative Regulation in the United States and the Federal
Republic of Germany, 18 CoMP. LAB. L.J. 547, 551 (1997) (describing effects of ge-
netic variation). Three to four percent of newborns possess genetic or congenital
defects. See id. (noting that genetic variations "are not that uncommon"). All indi-
viduals possess between five and seven lethal recessive genes, as well as an undeter-
mined number of genes that can predispose their carriers to diseases in the future.
See id. at 556 (indicating that although all individuals possess lethal recessive genes,
these genes do not cause genetic diseases in all individuals).
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codes? 22 Considering that genes dictate individuals' physical characteris-
tics and much of their mental abilities, it is apparent that many employers
can and do discriminate on the basis of genetics. Moreover, there are few
legal restrictions preventing employers from engaging in genetic discrimi-
nation. No law prevents employers from favoring job applicants or em-
ployees because of their height, size, muscle structure, hair color, eye
color, or even intelligence-all of which are partially or totally determined
by genes.23 Instead, employers violate the law only by discriminating on
the basis of individuals' genetically dictated skin color, race, or sex. 2 4 This
discrepancy in legal treatment is based on the fact that few employers, if
any, stigmatize physical characteristics such as hair, eye color, or even size,
whereas there is a long history of prejudice on the basis of sex, race, and
color.
The question, therefore, is not whether discrimination based upon an
individual's genetic code should be allowed. Rather, the better question is
whether the law should permit discrimination against individuals based
upon actual or perceived genetic variations from the "normal" human
genotype. 25 From this perspective, several genetically related scenarios
22. See Nicole Silvestri, Comment, Echazabal and the Threat to Self-Defense: The
Most Recent Call for a Consistent, Interstate Genetic Nondiscrimination Policy, 7 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMp. L. 409, 412-13 (2005) (noting pros and cons of prohibiting employers
from making hiring decisions based upon genetic information). Agreeing on a
definition of "genetic discrimination" is a challenge in and of itself. See id. at 411
(noting that experts disagree on definition of "genetic discrimination"). Nonethe-
less, Silvestri adopted a definition proposed by Robert Olick, an expert in both law
and bioethics. See id. Olick has suggested that genetic discrimination is "'negative
differential treatment of an individual based solely upon that person's possession
of one or more genetic traits that deviate from the "normal" genome, or on the
perception that the individual possesses one or more genetic traits that deviate
from the "norm," when that person is asymptomatic."' Id. at 411-12 (quoting Rob-
ert S. Olick, Genes in the Workplace: New Frontiers for ADA Law, Policy, and Research, in
EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 285, 288 (Pe-
ter David Blanck ed., 2000)).
23. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(h) (2007) ("The definition of the
term 'impairment' does not include physical characteristics such as eye color, hair
color, left-handedness, or height, weight or muscle tone that are within 'normal'
range and are not the result of a physiological disorder."). The United States Su-
preme Court has endorsed this position, stating:
[A]n employer is free to decide that physical characteristics or medical
conditions that do not rise to the level of an impairment-such as one's
height, build, or singing voice-are preferable to others, just as it is free
to decide that some limiting, but not substantially limiting, impairments
make individuals less than ideally suited for a job.
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 490-91 (1999).
24. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination by
employers with fifteen or more employees on basis of race, color, religion, sex, and
national origin).
25. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 2-3 (asking whether prominent institutions in
society should be able "to take into account genetically derived information that
reveals an individual's prospects for future disease and incapacity"). Epstein
adopted the definition of genetic discrimination formulated by Paul R. Billings,
who described it as "'discrimination directed against an individual or family based
[Vol. 54: p. 91
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can arise that tend to expose an individual to discrimination. They are:
(1) abnormal physical traits-such as height, weight, and size; (2) sympto-
matic genetic disease; (3) asymptomatic, late-onset genetic disease; (4)
asymptomatic genetic predisposition to disease; and (5) the unaffected
carrying of a genetic disorder. 26
Any one of these five scenarios could expose an individual to discrimi-
nation in the workplace. Most employers, concerned about productivity
and costs such as health benefits and life insurance, would tend to eschew
a job applicant who either has or will have a genetically related disorder,
or who has a heightened risk of developing one. 27 In the case of abnor-
mal physical traits and symptomatic genetic diseases, the ADA provides
relatively clear guidance as to whether such individuals would meet the
definition of "disability," and would thus fall within the statute's protec-
tion.28 In contrast, for asymptomatic individuals who will or might de-
velop genetic diseases, or who might pass them to offspring, coverage
under the ADA is uncertain. 29 It is precisely these types of individuals who
may now be identified with increased accuracy through the genetic testing
solely on an apparent or perceived genetic variation from the "normal" human
genotype.' See id. at 3 (quoting Paul R. Billings et al., Discrimination as a Conse-
quence of Genetic Testing, 50 Am.J. HuM. GENETICS 476, 476 (1992)). Another com-
mentator has used a definition of "genetic discrimination" that includes only
asymptomatic individuals. See Deyerle, supra note 21, at 556 ("Genetic discrimina-
tion can be distinguished from traditional disability-based discrimination in that
the former category includes only discrimination against those who are visibly
asymptomatic at the time of the discretionary act.").
26. But see Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Discrimination in Employment and the Amer-
icans with Disabilities Act, 29 Hous. L. REv. 23, 39-52 (1992) (providing seven ge-
netic categories). Rothstein has termed his categories as follows: (1) "already-
expressed genetic diseases;" (2) "already-expressed minor genetic conditions;" (3)
"unexpressed late-onset genetic diseases;" (4) "genetic predisposition/increased
risk;" (5) "unaffected carrier of recessive and X-linked disorders;" (6) "having a
record of genetic disease;" and (7) "regarded as having a genetic condition." See
id. (formulating categories of genetic scenarios).
27. See StaceyJ. Bagley, Comment, Enough is Enough! Congress and Courts React
to Employers' Medical Screening and Surveillance Procedures, 99 DICK. L. REv. 723, 725-
26 (1995) (explaining reasons why employers may engage in medical screening
and surveillance). There is a seemingly unavoidable tension between the interests
of employees and those of employers: employees want jobs, dignity, reputation,
and legal rights, whereas employers need greater productivity. See id. at 723. Fur-
thermore, employers must be concerned about the liability they accept when they
hire physically or mentally unfit individuals. See id. (noting conflicting interests at
stake in debate over whether to permit genetic discrimination).
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006) (defining "disability"). Specifically, the
ADA defines "disability" as: "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities.. .; (B) a record of such impairment;
or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment." Id.
29. See Brian R. Gin, Note, Genetic Discrimination: Huntingdon's Disease and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 1406, 1419 (1997) ("No court has
yet addressed the question of whether genetic conditions are disabilities under the
ADA .... ").
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and screening made possible by successful completion of the Human Gen-
ome Project.30
III. GENETIC DISCRIMINATION AND THE ADA
Passage of the ADA seemingly settled the question of whether, as a
matter of public policy, employers should be allowed to discriminate
against job applicants or employees based upon their individual genetic
codes. In its report to Congress, the United States House of Representa-
tives Committee on Education and Labor, which considered the bill that
became the ADA, stated:
In conclusion, there is a compelling need to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimi-
nation against individuals with disabilities and for the integration
of persons with disabilities into the economic and social main-
stream of American life. Further, there is a need to provide
clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities. Finally, there is a
need to ensure that the [f]ederal [g]overnment plays a central
role in enforcing these standards on behalf of individuals with
disabilities.
3
'
From this sweeping statement of the statute's ultimate purpose, it can
be inferred that Congress intended that the ADA cover individuals with
both extant and inchoate disabilities.3 2 Apparently, the ADA is designed
to eliminate discrimination against all "individuals with disabilities."3 3 In
defining "disability," the House Committee listed muscular dystrophy and
multiple sclerosis-two diseases rooted in genetic aberrations-as exam-
ples of conditions, diseases, and infections that would constitute physical
30. See A Brief Guide to Genomics, supra note 17 (explaining Human Gen-
ome Project and its contributions to genetics). Completed in 2003, the Human
Genome Project determined the order of, or "sequenced," all three billion base
pairs of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) that make up the human genome. See id.
31. H.R. REP. No. 101485, pt. 2, at 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445, 451. This policy was codified in the "Purpose" clause of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2000) (adopting language of House Re-
port as purpose of statute).
32. See § 12101(b) (setting forth broad goals of ADA to eliminate discrimina-
tion based on disability). Although Congress could have inserted language in the
ADA directly dealing with genetic conditions, it appears from the definition of the
term "disability" that Congress instead focused on existing past or present impair-
ments. See Rothstein, supra note 26, at 39 ("Congress enacted the ADA without any
serious consideration about the law's effect on individuals with various genetic
conditions. The ADA itself is silent on the issue, as are the EEOC implementing
regulations. Only brief mentions of genetic disabilities are made in the volumi-
nous legislative history.") (footnotes omitted).
33. See § 12101 (b) (2) (describing one purpose of statute).
[Vol. 54: p. 91
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impairments. 34 Because job applicants suffering from multiple sclerosis
are disabled, and therefore protected under the ADA, the statutory lan-
guage suggests that job applicants who carry genes that will or may cause
multiple sclerosis are likewise disabled.35
The ADA also suggests that the latent nature of certain genetic dis-
eases should not disqualify individuals from being considered disabled.
The House Committee specifically included a person infected with the
Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) in its examples of individuals who
are disabled under the ADA.3 6 It is difficult to justify considering asymp-
tomatic, HIV-infected individuals "disabled" under the ADA while not
granting the same status to individuals who bear genetic defects that will
cause, for example, Huntington's disease.3
7
The very mechanics of the job application process indicate that Con-
gress intended the ADA to cover individuals with eventually or potentially
disabling genetic defects. Some aspects of an individual's genetic makeup
are obvious upon observation. For example, attributes such as hair color,
skin color, eye color, height, and facial features-all of which are geneti-
cally determined-are readily observable by most prospective employers.
The rest of an individual's genomes, however, are hidden within the chro-
mosomes of that individual's cells. Employers, therefore, could only learn
about the bulk of job applicants' or employees' genetic makeup-includ-
ing the applicants' or employees' predisposition to various diseases-
through genetic screening.38
34. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 (explaining definition of "disabil-
ity"); see also Deyerle, supra note 21, at 571 (citing § 12211) (noting that certain
conditions that are arguably genetic-such as homosexuality, bisexuality, and klep-
tomania-are specifically excluded from ADA's definition of disability).
35. See George P. Smith, II & Thaddeus J. Burns, Genetic Determinism or Genetic
Discrimination?, 11J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 23, 25 (1994) ("Unlike informa-
tion about a specific transient condition or illness, data pointing to a genetic disor-
der will affect, and may stigmatize, a person throughout his or her life.").
36. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (explaining definition of disabled).
The Supreme Court later confirmed that HIV-positive individuals are considered
disabled under the ADA. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998) (holding
that HIV qualifies as disability under ADA).
37. See generally Gin, supra note 29, at 1422-24 (analogizing Huntington's dis-
ease to HIV infection for purposes of ADA protections). Specifically, Gin noted
three similarities between HIV-positive status and Huntington's disease, which he
believed support the argument that Huntington's disease-like HIV-should be
considered a disability under the ADA:
First, predictive tests for both diseases are extremely accurate and precise.
Second, at the time of diagnosis, victims of both conditions may have no
symptoms and may remain healthy for many years. Finally, although the
exact time of onset is unascertainable, death within a given range of years
is extremely likely, if not certain.
Id. at 1423 (footnotes omitted).
38. See Deyerle, supra note 21, at 554 (discussing differences between genetic
testing, screening, and monitoring). Genetic screening involves a test that can
determine whether a person either has a genetic condition that predisposes to-
wards development of a particular disease, or carries a genetic defect that could be
7
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The ADA prohibits such medical examinations and other inquiries
that could reveal job applicants' genetic defects before offers of employ-
ment are extended.3 9 Underlying this prohibition is the goal of prevent-
ing employers from excluding job applicants before the applicants'
abilities to perform their potential jobs are evaluated. 40 Again, it stretches
the rules of logic to conclude that Congress would prohibit pre-offer medi-
cal examinations or inquiries that could reveal genetic disease or defects-
or propensities for such diseases-but permit employers to discriminate
against qualified individuals on account of their genetic information. 4 1 It
appears that, to Congress, the possibility of future incapacity does not by
itself render individuals unqualified for presently available positions. 42
In summary, the ADA appears to prohibit employers from discrimi-
nating against job applicants or employees based upon their individual
genetic codes. Congress intended the ADA to prohibit discrimination
against qualified individuals who are disabled. Congress also intended
that the term "disability" include both extant and inchoate conditions. If
individuals who suffer from diseases that substantially limit major life func-
tions are protected under the ADA, then individuals who will or may suffer
in the future from the same diseases by virtue of genetic defects should
likewise be protected.
The fact that genetic diseases are latent should be of no more legal
consequence than the fact that HIV-infected individuals have not yet de-
veloped AIDS. Indeed, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), the agency charged with implementing Title I of the ADA, en-
dorsed the extension of the statute to individuals who are subject to dis-
transmitted to that person's offspring. See id. (defining genetic screening). Some
of the more than 4,000 known genetic diseases are cystic fibrosis, Duchenne mus-
cular dystrophy, Huntingdon's chorea disease, juvenile diabetes, Lesch-Nylan dis-
ease, sickle cell anemia, phenylketonuria, and hemochromatosis. See Epstein,
supra note 4, at 2 (detailing advances in field of genetic testing).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2) (A) (2006) (providing that employers may not
"conduct a medical examination or make inquiries ofjob applicants as to whether
the applicants have disabilities or as to the nature or severity of such disabilities").
40. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 72 (detailing ways in which employers
have historically engaged in genetic discrimination). Specifically, legislative his-
tory indicates that the ADA sought to eliminate the practice where:
[E]mployment application forms and employment interviews requested
information concerning an applicant's physical or mental condition.
This information was often used to exclude applicants with disabilities-
particularly those with so-called hidden disabilities such as epilepsy, dia-
betes, emotional illness, heart disease and cancer-before their ability to
perform the job was even evaluated.
Id.
41. See § 12111(8) (providing that "qualified" individuals are those who can
perform "essential functions" of employment positions "with or without reasonable
accommodation").
42. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 55 (explaining that "[t]he term 'quali-
fied' refers to whether the individual is qualified at the time of the job action in
question; the possibility of future incapacity does not by itself render the person
not qualified").
[Vol. 54: p. 91
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crimination on the basis of genetic information relating to illness, disease,
or other disorders. 43 Although the ADA appears to prohibit genetic dis-
crimination, an analysis of its application to certain genetic scenarios leads
to a far different conclusion.
IV. DEFICIENCIES IN APPLYING THE ADA TO GENETIC DISORDERS
If Congress intended to protect individuals who carry discernible ge-
netic defects from discrimination in the workplace, does the ADA, in fact,
provide such protection? By its own terms, the statute purports to protect
every "qualified individual with a disability."4 4 Under the ADA, a "disabil-
ity" is "(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities ... ; (B) a record of such an impairment;
or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment."45 Unfortunately,
despite the statute's broad statement of purpose, this definition does not
seem to apply very well to the five genetically related scenarios identified
in Part II.46
A. Abnormal Physical Traits
The physical traits of human beings are dictated primarily by their
genes. For example, hair color, eye color, skin color, height, and size are
largely, if not exclusively, determined by genes. Typically, such physical
characteristics are not considered impairments that would constitute disa-
bilities under the ADA. Such is the case, provided that expression of these
characteristics falls within a range for expression defined under the ADA
as "normal."
4 7
43. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, COMPLIANCE MANUAL§ 902.8 (1992), available at http://www.eeoc.gov./policy/docs/902cm.html (call-
ing for application of ADA to genetic discrimination). Specifically, the EEOC
stated:
[The "regarded as having an impairment"] part of the definition of "disa-
bility" applies to individuals who are subjected to discrimination on the
basis of genetic information relating to illness, disease, or other disorders.
Covered entities that discriminate against individuals on the basis of such
genetic information are regarding the individuals as having impairments
that substantially limit a major life activity. Those individuals, therefore,
are covered by the third part of the definition of "disability."
Id. This is a reversal of the EEOC's original position, which held that the defini-
tion of disability did not include "characteristic predisposition to illness or dis-
ease." See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(h) (2007) (providing guidance on
meaning of disability under ADA).
44. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (providing definition of "qualified individual
with a disability").
45. See § 12102(2) (providing definition of "disability").
46. For a discussion of how and why discrimination based on genetic informa-
tion may occur in the workplace, and for an identification of five specific scenarios
in which such discrimination may occur, see supra notes 22-30 and accompanying
text.
47. See H.R. REp. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51 (defining "disability" under ADA);
H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 28 (defining "physical impairment" under ADA);
9
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When a physical trait is abnormal, however, individuals possessing
such trait may be considered "disabled" under the ADA under two possi-
ble theories. First, the abnormal physical trait may constitute a physical
impairment "that substantially limits one or more major life activities of
[the possessing] individual."48 For example, individuals who are morbidly
obese as a result of genetic defects-where their obesity substantially limits
their ability to walk-would qualify as disabled under the first prong of the
ADA's definition of "disability.
'49
As an alternative, individuals who have abnormal physical traits may
be disabled because they are "regarded as having [a substantially limiting]
impairment."50 For example, people who stand four feet, five inches high
as a result of a genetic defect known as achondroplastic dwarfism may be
treated by their employers as having a substantially limiting impairment.
Although dwarfism itself does not substantially limit any major life activity,
employers treating the condition as if it does renders those with the condi-
tion disabled under the ADA.5 1 In short, for individuals who possess ab-
normal physical traits as a result of genetic defects, the ADA clearly
provides protection by including them within either the first or second
prong of the definition of "disability."
B. Symptomatic Genetic Disease
Whether individuals who are suffering symptoms from genetic dis-
eases are disabled under the ADA depends upon the severity of the impact
of such symptoms on those individuals' lives. Specifically, the impairments
29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(h) (stating that, under ADA, definition of term
"impairment" does not include physical characteristics, provided that such charac-
teristics are within "normal" range and not resulting from physiological disorder).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2) (A) (describing limiting characteristic of physical im-
pairment). Under this prong of the ADA's definition of disability, the fact that
individuals have physical or mental impairments is not enough to meet the statu-
tory criteria. See William J. McDevitt, Defining the Term Disability Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 281, 285-88 (1998) (discussing physical
or mental impairment prong of ADA's definition of disability). The impairments
must also substantially limit the individuals' ability to engage in major life activities
such as seeing, walking, hearing, speaking, or working. See id.
49. Cf Cook v. R.I., Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation, & Hosps., 10 F.3d
17, 23 (1st Cir. 1993) (stating that jury could view obesity as impairment that inter-
fered with major life activities); see also Steven M. Ziolkowski, Comment, The Status
of Weight-Based Discrimination Under the Americans with Disabilities Act After Cook v.
Rhode Island Department of Mental Health, Retardation, and Hospitals, 74 B.U.
L. REv. 667, 680-83 (1994) (providing exhaustive analysis of Cook).
50. See § 12102(2)(C) (listing "regarded as having such an impairment" as
one of three bases under which individual is deemed disabled).
51. See Dexler v. Tisch, 660 F. Supp. 1418, 1429 (D. Conn. 1987) (finding that
dwarfism constitutes substantially limiting impairment). Although Dexler con-
cerned Title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794 (2006), and
not the ADA, Congress has directed that the ADA cannot be construed to apply a
lesser standard than the Rehabilitation Act and its regulations. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12201(a) (2006) (instructing courts on how to interpret ADA).
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that result from genetic diseases must substantially limit one or more of
sufferers' major life activities. 5 2 Under the ADA, major life activities are
the basic activities "that the average person in the general population can
perform with little or no difficulty."53 They include basic functions such
as "caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing,
speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 54 Reproduction and inti-
mate sexual relationships also fall within this category.
55
Impairments fall into two categories: those that are substantially limit-
ing per se and those that are substantially limiting for particular individu-
als. Individuals who are blind, deaf, or paralyzed are substantially limited
by their conditions, regardless of their individual situations. For less se-
vere impairments, however, consideration is given to the severity, dura-
tion, and permanency of the unique impacts of the impairments on
particular suffering individuals. 56 Under the ADA, therefore, neither se-
vere but short-lived impairments-such as broken bones-nor chronic but
mild impairments-such as myopia-are considered disabilities.
Based on these principles, individuals who suffer from symptomatic
genetic diseases must show either that their diseases are per se substan-
tially limiting or that their symptoms are of such severity and duration that
they are substantially limited in their abilities to engage in recognized ma-
jor life activities in order to qualify under the first prong of the ADA's
definition of "disability." Thus, individuals in the latter stages of Hunting-
ton's chorea-a hereditary disease characterized by chronic, ceaseless, and
involuntary jerky movements as well as mental deterioration that termi-
nates in dementia-would surely be considered disabled.57 Individuals
who have not yet experienced symptoms, however, would not.5
8
52. See § 12102(2) (A) (defining requirements of impairments).
53. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(i) (2007) (defining "major life activities"
for purposes of discerning whether condition constitutes disability under ADA).
54. Id. (providing examples of major life activities). The EEOC has stated
that its list is not intended to be exhaustive; sitting, standing, lifting, and reaching
are also considered "major life activities." See id.
55. See H.R. REP. No. 101485, pt. 2, at 52 (providing examples of activities
that constitute major life activities under ADA); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624, 638 (1998) (holding that "[rieproduction falls well within the phrase 'major
life activity'").
56. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (describing assessment of whether
impairment is substantially limiting). The EEOC regulations list the following fac-
tors for assessing substantiality of an impairment: "(1) the nature and severity of
the impairment, (2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment, and (3)
the permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term
impact of, or resulting from, the impairment." See id.
57. See generally HUNTINGTON'S DISrASE Ass'N, supra note 1 (explaining causes
and effects of Huntington's disease).
58. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (explaining that individuals whose
daily activities have not yet been affected by disease cannot be considered disabled
under ADA). This classification causes some impairments to be disabling for par-
ticular individuals but not for others-depending on the stage of the disease or
disorder, the presence of other impairments that combine to make the impair-
11
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C. Asymptomatic, Late-Onset Genetic Disease
It is not clear from the plain language of the ADA whether the statute
covers individuals who have latent genetic defects that will eventually ripen
into disabling diseases. 59 The first prong of the definition of "disability"
would not ordinarily apply to asymptomatic individuals. 60 Generally
speaking, such individuals have yet to experience any effects of their
condition.
61
Asymptomatic individuals, however, who have genetic defects, may
pass them to one or more of their children. It appears, therefore, that the
ability of these individuals to procreate and to have intimate sexual rela-
tionships-both recognized as major life activities-may be substantially
limited. 62 Affected individuals, therefore, may fall within the ADA's first
prong definition of "disability," and thus be afforded the ADA's protection
from discrimination. The suggestion that the ADA covers asymptomatic
individuals with genetic defects is also present in the Supreme Court's rea-
soning in Bragdon v. Abbott.
63
The third prong of the definition of "disability"-being regarded as
having an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity-ap-
pears to apply regardless of a disease's impact on major life activities. 64
The EEOC has stated that the "regarded as" disability prong covers an
individual who:
(1) [h]as a physical or mental impairment that does not substan-
tially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as
constituting such limitation;
ment disabling, or any number of other factors. See id. Other impairments, how-
ever, such as HIV infection, are inherently substantially limiting. See id.
59. See Rothstein, supra note 26, at 42 (describing genetic diseases, some of
which would be considered disabilities under ADA and some of which would not).
60. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(h) (explaining that disabled individu-
als are those who experience symptoms due to impairments).
61. See id. (distinguishing impairments from environmental and economic
factors, which do not constitute impairments under ADA).
62. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998) (holding that reproduc-
tion is major life activity); H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 52 (providing examples
of activities, including participation in intimate sexual relationships, that consti-
tute major life activities under ADA); see also Gin, supra note 29, at 1427 (explain-
ing how Huntington's chorea disease, like HIV, often prevents sufferers from
procreating).
63. See Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638. The Court stated: "Reproduction and the
sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life process itself.... Our evalua-
tion of the medical evidence leads us to conclude that respondent's [HIV] infec-
tion substantially limited her ability to reproduce." Id. at 638-39 (noting role of
reproduction as major life activity).
64. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(1) (explaining that ADA's "regarded
as" definition of "disability" is available to individuals whose impairments or dis-
eases do not meet other two statutory possibilities).
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(2) [h]as a physical or mental impairment that substantially lim-
its major life activities only as a result of the attitudes of others
toward such impairment; or
(3) [h]as none of the impairments defined [by the regulations as
per se impairments] but is treated by a covered entity as having a
substantially limiting impairment.
65
The EEOC regulation, unfortunately, does not specifically cover asymp-
tomatic disease-carrying individuals.66
The EEOC has attempted to remedy this gap in coverage by issuing
supplemental guidance that states that the third prong of the definition of
"disability" applies to individuals who are discriminated against on the ba-
sis of genetic information relating to illness, disease, or other disorders. 67
Courts, however, do not always accept the EEOC's interpretation of the
ADA.68 In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,69 the Supreme Court limited the
application of the "regarded as" prong to include just two situations: when
"(1) a covered entity mistakenly believes that a person has a physical im-
pairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2) a
covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment
substantially limits one or more major life activities." 70 Likewise, some
lower federal courts have rejected the EEOC's expansive definition of "re-
garded as." 7 1 This dichotomy between the EEOC and judicial interpreta-
65. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(1) (2008) (explaining how individuals may be "re-
garded as" having disabilities under ADA).
66. See id. (omitting specific mention of asymptomatic carriers of genetic dis-
eases); Deyerle, supra note 21, at 574 (explaining limited scope of "regarded as"
definition of disability and difficulty facing potentially disabled, but asymptomatic,
individuals).
67. See U.S. EQuAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 43, § 902.8
(explaining congressional intent that ADA protects even asymptomatic individuals
when such individuals are subjects of discrimination).
68. See, e.g., Ellison v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 85 F.3d 187, 189 (5th Cir.
1996) (holding that employee who was treated for breast cancer was not disabled
under ADA); see also Richard H. Underwood & Ronald G. Cadle, Genetics, Genetic
Testing, and the Specter of Discrimination: A Discussion Using Hypothetical Cases, 85 Ky.
L.J. 665, 678 (1996) (explaining that "[t]he EEOC view may not be accepted by
some courts").
69. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
70. Id. at 489 (noting that misperceptions of impairment often result from
stereotypes and not from actual capabilities). The 110th Congress reversed the
holdings of Sutton and other decisions that had limited the scope of the ADA by
passing the ADA Restoration Act of 2007. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008
§ 2(a), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (to be codified in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C.).
71. See Deyerle, supra note 21, at 572. According to Deyerle, "[Bly analogiz-
ing to the HIV case law the expansive definition of disability could easily be found
by the courts to encompass latent genetic conditions or predispositions to disease.
Whether the courts will accept such an expanded definition of disability as reflect-
ing [c]ongressional intent is yet to be determined." Id.
13
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tion of the ADA leaves in doubt the outcome of potential cases involving
discrimination against asymptomatic individuals with genetic defects.
D. Asymptomatic Genetic Predisposition to Disease
If individuals with genetic defects are not destined to develop
debilitating illnesses, but merely have increased risks of becoming ill, are
they disabled under the ADA?72 The same arguments that can be made
for individuals with genetic disorders who are asymptomatic can also be
made for individuals who are only predisposed to contract certain dis-
eases.7 3 An individual's ability to engage in reproductive activity may be
substantially limited if the genetic defects he or she carries can be inher-
ited.74 In such circumstances, the first prong of the ADA's definition of
"disability" may apply.75 In addition, individuals who are predisposed to
contract genetically based diseases may be regarded as having impair-
ments that substantially limit major life activities and, therefore, fall within
the third prong of the ADA's "disability" definition. This final possibility
will only be available, however, if courts adopt the expanded view of dis-
crimination based upon genetic information now promulgated by the
EEOC.
7 6
Nevertheless, the applicability of the "regarded as" prong of the
ADA's definition of "disability" to individuals who are predisposed to ge-
netically related diseases is tenuous.7 7 The key factor in applying the "re-
garded as" definition of "disability" is employer perception. 78 This, in
72. See Rothstein, supra note 26, at 45-46 (observing uncertainty of scope of
ADA). Rothstein noted: "Although many of the recent discoveries in genetics have
involved identifying the loci of genes for single gene disorders, future advances will
include discovering the genetic factors that predispose individuals to multifactorial
diseases." Id. at 45 (noting large potential impact of genetic testing on determin-
ing individuals' risk of contracting disorders). The development of some diseases,
such as certain forms of cancer and cardiovascular disease, are dependent on ex-
posure to environmental factors. See id.
73. For a discussion of how asymptomatic individuals could potentially have
disabilities under the terms of the ADA, see supra notes 59-71 and accompanying
text.
74. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.20) (2007) ("The determination of
whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diag-
nosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that impair-
ment on the life of the individual.").
75. See id. (providing factors to be used to determine whether impairment is
substantially limiting).
76. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, supra note 43, § 902.8
(addressing issue of asymptomatic individuals facing discrimination). The exam-
ple that the EEOC used to demonstrate its expansion of "regarded as" to individu-
als who are subject to discrimination on the basis of genetic information involves
an asymptomatic person whose genetic profile reveals an increased susceptibility to
colon cancer. See id.
77. See 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(1) (providing examples of when indi-
viduals satisfy "regarded as" prong).
78. See id. ("[I]f an individual can show that an employer or other covered
entity made an employment decision because of a perception of disability based on
[Vol. 54: p. 91
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turn, is a question of intent.79 Unless employees or job applicants can
prove that their employers believed that they suffered from a substantially
limiting impairment, the employees or applicants will not prevail under
the "regarded as" prong.80 Proving employers' considerations could be
difficult, if not impossible, in situations where employees or applicants
have only the potential to develop certain diseases. 8 1 For individuals with
genetic disorders, however, whether a disease is inevitable or merely a
higher-than-normal likelihood is irrelevant if they suffer discrimination.
8 2
E. Unaffected Carriers of Genetic Disorders
As discussed above, the applicability of the ADA to individuals who
are merely genetically predisposed to diseases is questionable. 8 3 The stat-
ute's applicability to those who only carry genetic disorders is even more
in doubt. In these situations, carriers themselves will be unaffected by the
genetic maladies but may transmit them to their offspring.
Although the same arguments used to support the position that the
ADA already protects individuals with asymptomatic genetic disorders can
also be employed on behalf of unaffected carriers, they are even weaker
when applied to this scenario.8 4 For example, the argument that unaf-
fected carriers' abilities to reproduce are substantially limited depends on
'myth, fear, or stereotype,' the individual will satisfy the 'regarded as' part of the
definition of disability.").
79. See Francis v. City of Meriden, 129 F.3d 281, 284 (2d Cir. 1997) (explain-
ing that "regarded as" definition of disability "turns on the employer's perception
of the employee, . . . not whether the employee has a disability").
80. See id. at 286 (distinguishing between employers' belief that particular em-
ployees are disabled and employers' belief that employees suffer from statutory
impairment); see also Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 510-11 (7th
Cir. 1998) (noting that no evidence supported contention that employer believed
employee suffered from substantially limiting impairment). In Davidson, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that an employee with Adult Residual Attention Deficit Hyperac-
tivity Disorder was not "regarded as" being disabled by her employer because she
was not able to show that the employer perceived her to be substantially limited in
her ability to perform a class or range ofjobs. See id. at 511 ("[T]he most that one
can infer from the record is that [the employer] considered [the employee] una-
ble to perform one job for one employer.").
81. See, e.g., EEOC v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 243 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2001)
(holding that testing for predisposition to disease does not necessarily indicate
that employer is misperceiving current impairment).
82. See Brian M. Holt, Comment, Genetically Defective: The Judicial Interpretation
of the Americans With Disabilities Act Fails to Protect Against Genetic Discrimination in the
Workplace, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 457, 464 (2002) (noting that language of ADA
does not clearly state whether Congress intended that statute protect individuals
predisposed to developing diseases in future).
83. For a discussion of the ADA's ambiguity regarding its protections of indi-
viduals who are predisposed to genetic diseases, see supra notes 72-82 and accom-
panying text.
84. For a summary of the arguments that suggest that the protections of the
ADA apply to individuals with asymptomatic genetic disorders, see supra notes 59-
82 and accompanying text.
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various factors-including whether the mode of inheritance is dominant,
recessive, or X-linked, the nature of the disorders in question, and the age
of onset.8 5 The argument that employers regard applicants or employees
as having impairments that substantially limit major life activities implies a
sophisticated knowledge of genetics on the part of the employers. 8 6
An additional problem under the third prong, or "regarded as" defi-
nition, is that unaffected carriers are just that-unaffected. It would be
extremely difficult for unaffected carriers to prove that their employers
treated them like individuals who have impairments that substantially limit
major life activities. Employers' best defense to discrimination claims
would be to acknowledge the truth, i.e., that unaffected carriers are not
and never will be substantially limited as a result of genetic mutations that
they carry.
8 7
Whether the ADA protects unaffected carriers of genetic disorders is
far from certain. Although several arguments to support coverage could
be made, nothing in the statute or the regulations clearly dictates an af-
firmative answer to the question. It was to remedy the resulting potential
gap in coverage that Congress passed the Genetic Information Nondis-
crimination Act of 2008.88
85. See Rothstein, supra note 26, at 49 (explaining that some asymptomatic
carriers of genetic diseases may or may not fall within ADA's definition of disabil-
ity). For example, a parent who carries a predisposition to a genetic disorder in a
recessive gene is only twenty-five percent likely to produce offspring affected by the
disorder. See id. at 45 (discussing potential risk of developing genetic diseases).
86. See id. at 48 (noting that employers' knowledge of genetics affects argu-
ments for including carriers of genetic diseases within ADA's protections).
87. See id. at 49-50 ("A sophisticated employer who knew that a carrier of a
recessive or X-linked disorder is not at risk would not regard the carrier as having
an impairment."). Rothstein has proposed a third theory by which an unaffected
carrier is covered under the ADA: an employer would be guilty of discrimination
under Section 12112(b) (4) if that employer excluded or otherwise denied equal
jobs or benefits to an unaffected carrier because such individual has a relationship
or associates with a person who has a known disability-to wit, the symptomatic
child of the carrier. See id.
88. See Jennifer Chorpening, Genetic Disability: A Modest Proposal to Modify the
ADA to Protect Against Some Forms of Genetic Discrimination, 82 N.C. L. REv. 1441, 1475
(2004) (recommending certain amendments to ADA). Chorpening proposed
amending the ADA so that it stops discrimination against individuals who are
asymptomatic but predisposed to diseases protected under the statute. See id. at
1475. She would also have the ADA allow employers to refuse to hire asymptom-
atic individuals whose diseases would constitute a direct threat to themselves or
others. See id. at 1476 (advocating clear exception for employers' refusal to hire in
certain circumstances).
Other commentators have argued that the best way to protect individuals with
genetic predispositions from employment discrimination is to amend Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006). See, e.g., Holt,
supra note 82, at 479-80 ("Amending Title VII would enable applicants who have
been rejected based on their genetic predispositions to establish a prima facie case
of unlawful discrimination."). Still others have proposed that the solution can be
found in a new statute that would prohibit use of genetic information in hiring,
firing, and terms and conditions of employment, but still allow employers to refuse
[Vol. 54: p. 91
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V. OVERVIEW OF TITLE II OF THE GENETIC INFORMATION
NONDISCRIMINATION ACT
Despite Congress's apparent intent to have the ADA prohibit discrim-
ination based upon genetic defects or disorders, a careful analysis of the
statute leaves great uncertainty as to whether the courts would so apply it.
Indeed, the Supreme Court limited the application of the "regarded as"
prong of the definition of "disability," which is a key argument in applying
the ADA to some stages of genetic defects. 8 9 In addition, other courts
have failed to find unlawful discrimination even when medical tests reveal
susceptibility to medical problems.90 Congress passed GINA to address
these deficiencies and to fill the resultant gap in coverage.
A. Prohibited Practices
The bill that became the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
of 2008 was first introduced to the House of Representatives by Represen-
tative Louise M. Slaughter (D., N.Y.) in 1995.91 After thirteen years of
torturous wrangling, Congress finally produced a law that clearly and un-
equivocally prohibits discrimination based upon individuals' genetic traits
not only in the area of access to health insurance, but also in the realm of
employment. 9 2 Congress noted the reported problems of genetic discrim-
ination in the workplace, such as the use of genetic testing to screen out
workers with sickle cell trait.93 Congress also found "the existing patch-
to hire or to fire in order to maintain a safe workplace. See, e.g., Jared A. Feldman
& Richard J. Katz, Note, Genetic Testing & Discrimination in Employment: Recom-
mending a Uniform Statutory Approach, 19 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 389, 424-27
(2002) (providing model statute to achieve balance between protection of employ-
ees and flexibility for employers).
89. See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) (holding
that "regarded as" prong of ADA's definition of disability only applies when cov-
ered entities believe that individuals are substantially limited in one or more life
activity).
90. See EEOC v. Rockwell Int'l. Corp., 243 F.3d 1012, 1017 (7th Cir. 2001)
(finding for defendants when plaintiffs could not prove that their employer con-
sidered them to be substantially limited).
91. See Editorial, Genetic Discrimination-Fundamental Rights, PmILA. INQUIRER,
May 3, 2008, at A8 (discussing history of bill that became GINA).
92. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
233, 122 Stat. 881 (2008) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff to 2000ff-li), at
pmbl. (declaring that GINA's purpose is "to prohibit discrimination on the basis of
genetic information with respect to health insurance and employment").
93. See id. § 2(4) (citing facts of Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab.,
135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998), as one of many reasons to pass statute). In Norman-
Bloodsaw, workers at a laboratory operated by federal and state agencies alleged
that they had been tested by their employers for several medical conditions with-
out the workers' knowledge or consent. See 135 F.3d at 1264. The Ninth Circuit
found for the defendants in the workers' claim under the ADA. See id.
17
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work of state and federal laws to be confusing and inadequate to protect
[the public] from discrimination."9 4
Title II of GINA contains provisions that prohibit discrimination
based upon genetic information in employment.95 These provisions apply
to employers, and their employees, who meet the requirements found in
other federal laws.9 6 The statute further extends obligations to employ-
ment agencies, unions, and other labor organizations. 97
GINA has several basic tenets. First, it is unlawful for employers to
discriminate against employees in terms of hiring, promotion, firing, or
any other terms and conditions of employment.98 Secondly, it is also un-
lawful for employers to negatively limit, segregate, or classify employees
because of genetic information.99 Finally, it is unlawful for employers to
request, require, or purchase genetic information about employees or em-
ployees' family members, with limited exceptions. 10 0 These prohibitions
apply not only to employers, but also to employment agencies and labor
organizations.10 1 Employers, labor organizations, and joint labor-manage-
ment committees that are involved in training programs are also
covered.I0
2
In order to understand the rights and duties created by GINA, one
must understand the concept of "genetic information." Individuals can
now undergo genetic tests whereby their DNA, ribonucleic acid (RNA), or
94. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 2(5) (explaining develop-
ments in science and law that contributed to Congress's passing GINA).
95. See id. § 202 (detailing employment practices made unlawful by GINA).
On March 2, 2009, the EEOC issued proposed regulations explaining its interpre-
tations of GINA. See Regulations Under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimina-
tion Act of 2008, 74 Fed. Reg. 9056 (proposed Mar. 2, 2009) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pt. 1635). In these proposed regulations, the EEOC noted Congress's "in-
tent to prohibit discrimination with respect to a wide range of covered entity prac-
tices, including hiring, promotion and demotion, seniority, discipline,
termination, compensation, and the terms, conditions, and privileges of employ-
ment," and attempted to interpret all of Title II's prohibitions in light of this in-
tent. Id. at 9060.
96. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 201(2) (A), (B) (identi-
fying as subject employers those with fifteen or more employees, those that form
part of state or local governments, and certain federal government entities).
97. See id. § 201(2) (C).
98. See id. § 202(a) (describing circumstances in which discrimination based
on genetic information against employees is prohibited).
99. See id.
100. Id. § 202(b) (listing actions employers are prohibited from taking in re-
lation to employees' and their families' genetic information).
101. See id. §§ 203-04 (banning discrimination based on genetic information
and acquisitions of this information by employment agencies and labor
organizations).
102. See id. § 205 (extending prohibitions on discrimination based upon ge-
netic information to employers, labor organizations, or joint labor management
committees that control training programs).
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chromosomes may be analyzed.10 3 These tests are designed to detect ge-
notypes, mutations, and chromosomal changes in the subject individu-
als. 10 4 The information that is derived from these genetic tests is the
genetic information that employers are prohibited from using in making
employment decisions about employees. For example, if an analysis of an
employee's chromosomes revealed that the employee had a defect associ-
ated with Huntington's disease, then an employer would not be permitted
to use this information in making employment decisions.
GINA prohibits employers from requesting, requiring, or purchasing
genetic information about employees or employees' family members. 10 5
There are five exceptions to this rule. First, employers may acquire ge-
netic information if the information is acquired as a result of an inadver-
tent request or requirement of family medical histories.10 6 In light of the
prohibition under the ADA of requesting medical information before
making offers of employment, this scenario is most likely to arise after
employees begin their jobs.10 7
The second exception to the rule against obtaining employees' ge-
netic information allows employers to acquire information as a result of
their offers of health or genetic services to employees, particularly if the
information is part of bona fide wellness programs.10 8 In this situation,
employees must knowingly and voluntarily provide written authorization
before engaging in such services. 10 9 Individually identifiable information
about the results may only be shared with the subject employees or family
members and the licensed health care professionals or board certified ge-
103. See id. § 201(7)(A) (defining "genetic test" as "an analysis of human
DNA, RNA, chromosomes, proteins, or metabolites, that detects genotypes, muta-
tions, or chromosomal changes"). Misuse of genetic information derived from
such tests was one of the findings Congress used to justify passage of GINA. See id.
§ 2(1).
104. See id. § 201(7) (A) (defining "genetic test"). Tests that analyze proteins
or metabolites but that do not detect genotypes, mutations, or chromosomal
changes are not included in the definition of "genetic test." See id. § 201 (7) (B)
(excepting these tests from definition of "genetic test" under GINA).
105. See id. § 202(b) (declaring it unlawful for employers to acquire genetic
information except under certain circumstances).
106. See id. § 202(b) (1) (excepting unintentional requests for medical history
from statute's general prohibition).
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d) (2) (A) (2006) (prohibiting pre-employment
medical exams aimed to determine "whether [an] applicant is an individual with a
disability or... the nature or severity of such disability").
108. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 202(b) (2) (A) (except-
ing acquisition of genetic information for wellness program from statute's general
prohibition).
109. See id. § 202(b) (2) (B) (requiring that employees provide "prior, know-
ing, voluntary and written authorization" before employers may obtain their ge-
netic information under GINA's statutory exceptions).
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netic counselors who provide the testing services.I 10 Employers are only
entitled to information derived from the services in aggregate terms that
do not disclose the identity of particular subject-employees. 11'
A third exception involves state and federal medical leave laws. Em-
ployers may request family medical histories in order to comply with certi-
fication provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act and similar state
laws.1 2 Fourth, employers may purchase commercially and publicly avail-
able documents that contain family medical histories of employees.' 1 3
The final exception under which employers are entitled to obtain ge-
netic information regarding employees or family members involves ge-
netic monitoring.' 1 4 GINA defines "genetic monitoring" as the "periodic
examination of employees [in order] to evaluate acquired modifications
to their genetic material." 115 Since these modifications may have devel-
oped in the course of employment due to exposure of toxic substances in
the workplace, such monitoring is necessary to evaluate and respond to
their effects and causes.
Despite allowing for employers' gathering of genetic information in
these circumstances, GINA places many restrictions on such activity. First,
employers must provide employees -with written notice of genetic monitor-
ing. 1 6 Second, employees must provide written, knowing, and voluntary
authorization to such monitoring before it begins, unless the monitoring
is required by federal or state law.' 17 Third, employers must inform their
employees of individual monitoring results.1 18 Fourth, genetic monitor-
ing must comply with any federal or state genetic monitoring regula-
tions. 119 Finally, employers are entitled to receive only the results of
genetic monitoring in the aggregate so that acquired information does
not disclose the identity of any individual employees. 120
110. See id. § 202(b) (2) (C) (limiting "individually identifiable information
concerning the results" of genetic tests to employees and health care
professionals).
111. See id. § 202(b)(2)(D) (preventing disclosure of employees' identities in
conjunction with their genetic information).
112. See id. § 202(b)(3) (citing Family Medical Leave Act of 1993 § 103, 29
U.S.C. § 2613 (2006)).
113. See id. § 202(b) (4) (allowing acquisition of genetic information from
sources "including newspapers, magazines, periodicals and books, but not includ-
ing medical databases or court records").
114. See id. § 202(b) (5) (legalizing, under certain conditions, gathering of ge-
netic information "where the information involved is to be used for genetic moni-
toring of the biological effects of toxic substances in the workplace").
115. Id. § 201(5).
116. See id. § 202(b) (5) (A) (requiring written notice for genetic monitoring).
117. See id. § 202(b) (5) (B) (establishing need for "prior, knowing, voluntary
and written authorization" from employees).
118. See id. § 202(b)(5)(C) (requiring release of information to employees).
119. See id. § 202(b) (5) (D) (mandating that genetic monitoring be in accor-
dance with federal or state laws).
120. See id. § 202(b)(5)(E) (limiting results employers can receive from ge-
netic monitoring to aggregate). A final exception deals with DNA analysis for law
[Vol. 54: p. 91
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B. Confidentiality
In addition to proscribing various practices, GINA seeks to maintain
the confidentiality of genetic information of employees that comes into
the possession of employers, employment agencies, labor organizations, or
joint labor-management committees. In short, this information must be
maintained on separate forms and in separate medical files and be treated
as confidential medical records of individual employees or labor organiza-
tion members. 121 Genetic information, however, may be disclosed to sub-
ject employees, at their written request; to government officials
investigating compliance with the statute; to occupational or other health
researchers; in response to court orders; or in order to comply with provi-
sions of the Family and Medical Leave Act.
122
C. Remedies and Enforcement
GINA follows existing legislation in its remedies and enforcement
provisions. In general, the EEOC and the Attorney General have the same
powers, remedies, and procedures that exist under the Civil Rights Act of
1964.123 These powers include the ability to file and investigate a charge
of discrimination and to bring a civil action against the employer, employ-
ment agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management commit-
tee. 124 Remedies include hiring, reinstatement, promotion, back pay, and
injunctive relief.125 If an employee is a prevailing party, a court may award
attorney's fees, including expert fees and costs. 1 2 6 Finally, aggrieved em-
ployees may also recover compensatory and punitive damages up to
$300,000.127 GINA mirrors corresponding laws that prohibit discrimina-
tion against covered federal employees and certain state employees.
128
enforcement purposes. See id. § 202(b) (6) (authorizing genetic monitoring
"where the employer conducts DNA analysis for law enforcement purposes as a
forensic laboratory or for purposes of human remains identification, and requests
or requires genetic information of such employer's employees").
121. See id. § 206(a) (detailing storage of genetic information).
122. See id. § 206(b) (5) (noting that release of information may be required
by Family Medical Leave Act § 103).
123. See id. § 207(a) (incorporating powers and remedies in Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to e-6 (2006)).
124. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 to -6 (2006) (listing powers available to EEOC
and Attorney General in investigating and attempting to remedy purported in-
stances of discrimination).
125. See id. § 2000e-5(g) (listing remedies available for unlawful employment
practices).
126. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 207(a) (2) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (2006)) (authorizing courts to impose fees to be paid to prevailing
parties).
127. See id. § 207(a) (3) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006)).
128. See id. § 207(b) (citing Government Employee Rights Act of 1991, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-16b to 16c) (banning discrimination for individuals appointed by
state officials); id. § 207(c) (citing Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, 2
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1438 (2006)) (banning discrimination for employees of United
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D. Miscellaneous Provisions
Two miscellaneous provisions complete GINA and have bearing on its
understanding. First, the statute does not recognize a cause of action for
"disparate impact." While it is illegal for employers to discriminate in a
blatant and intentional way based upon employees' genetic information,
GINA does not prohibit employers from having job qualifications that, al-
though neutral on their face, are not job-related and have a disproportion-
ate impact on members of a protected class.' 29
For example, an employer could have a policy of only hiring persons
with blue eyes. Although the policy would have a disparate impact on per-
sons who do not possess the gene for blue eyes, it would not be grounds
for a discrimination action under GINA. Being sensitive to where science
may be going on this issue, GINA requires the establishment of a commis-
sion, known as the Genetic Nondiscrimination Study Commission, six
years after the statute's effective date. The Commission will study the de-
veloping science of genetics and make recommendations regarding
whether GINA should contain disparate impact as a cause of action.13 0
The other notable provision relates to medical information that is not
also genetic information. GINA clarifies that employers do not violate the
statute by using, acquiring, or disclosing medical information that is not
genetic information relating to a disease, disorder, or pathological condi-
tion, even where the information may have a genetic basis.' 3 ' In other
words, if the genetic information that comes into the possession or is used
by employers is not related to some pathological condition-for example,
a genetic predisposition to have prematurely gray hair-then no violation
has occurred.
VI. COMPROMISES UNDER GINA
Like most pieces of legislation, GINA contains a series of com-
promises that were necessary in order to ensure its passage. First, it ap-
pears that Congress compromised in defining a theory under which
aggrieved employees can bring private suits under the statute. Under the
States House of Representatives and United States Senate); id. § 207(d) (citing 3
U.S.C. § 411 (a) (1) (2006)) (banning discrimination for certain employees of Ex-
ecutive branch); id. § 207(e) (citing Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16
(2006)) (banning discrimination for federal employees in Executive and Judicial
Branches and other units).
129. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 208(a) (explaining
that "disparate impact" as defined by Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(k) (2006), "does not establish a cause of action under [GINA]").
130. See id. § 208(b) (establishing Genetic Nondiscrimination Study Commis-
sion to determine if disparate impact should be cause of action under GINA in
future).
131. See id. § 210 (requiring misuse of "genetic information about a mani-
fested disease, disorder, or pathological condition of an employee or member, in-
cluding a manifested disease, disorder, or pathological condition that has or may
have a genetic basis" for cause of action).
[Vol. 54: p. 91
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Civil Rights Act of 1964 and similar employment discrimination laws, em-
ployees can not only bring suit if they were blatantly discriminated against
because they are members of a protected class-i.e., disparate treatment-
but also if job qualifications, though neutral on their face, impact a pro-
tected class disproportionately-i.e., disparate impact. 132 GINA, however,
specifically bars lawsuits brought based upon a theory of disparate
impact.133
Instead, Congress provides that the Genetic Nondiscrimination Study
Commission is to be formed in six years in order "to review the developing
science of genetics and to make recommendations to Congress regarding
whether to provide a disparate impact cause of action under this Act."' 34
Congress is clearly concerned about how the science of genetics will de-
velop over time and how developments may impact public policy that at-
tempts to balance both employees' right to be free from discrimination
and employers' right to hire the best qualified people for available jobs.
In drafting GINA, Congress also compromised its main goal of pro-
tecting employees from genetic discrimination by allowing employers to
acquire this information in certain circumstances. Generally, GINA pro-
hibits employers from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic infor-
mation regarding employees or their families. 135 Despite this clear
prohibition, however, the statute describes several circumstances under
which employers can receive this information. For example, they may do
so when acquisition is the result of inadvertent requests, wellness pro-
grams, scenarios involving the Family and Medical Leave Act, criminal in-
vestigations, or when the information is publicly available.' 3 6 Even in
these situations, however, GINA prohibits employers from using legally ac-
quired information to discriminate. 13 7
Finally, exceptions to GINA's provisions related to confidentiality
temper the statute's generally harsh language. In most situations, GINA
prohibits employers from disclosing employees' genetic information, re-
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)-(c) (2006) (defining discriminatory practices
under Civil Rights Act); see also § 2000e-2(k) (further defining disparate impact
and required proof); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("The
Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form,
but discriminatory in operation.").
133. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act § 208 (leaving issue of
whether "disparate impact" should be cause of action under GINA to be deter-
mined by Commission in six years).
134. Id. § 208(b) (describing planned formation of Genetic Nondiscrimina-
tion Study Commission and its duties).
135. See id. § 202(b) (banning acquisition of genetic information except
under certain circumstances).
136. See id. (listing exceptions for acquisition of genetic information).
137. See id. § 202(c) (preventing legally obtained genetic information from
being used to discriminate).
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gardless of how that information is acquired. 138 This prohibition, how-
ever, is modified in circumstances where the request comes from the
employees themselves or the employees' family members, from occupa-
tional or other health researchers, from government compliance officials,
from court orders, or in connection with the Family and Medical Leave
Act.139 Most importantly, employees' genetic information may be dis-
closed without their consent if the information concerns the manifestation
of contagious diseases that involve death or life-threatening illness. 140
Clearly, in drafting GINA, Congress considered potential threats to public
health to be higher priorities than personal privacy concerns.
VII. CONCLUSION
The new millennium has brought with it an amazing new world of
science and technology. Perhaps no recent scientific discovery, however,
will be more important to the average person than that which will unlock
the door to increasing knowledge of life itself-genetics. Through the
Human Genome Project, scientists and doctors will possess an unprece-
dented ability to identify, and in some cases rectify, defects in human be-
ings' individual genomes. 14 1
With the ability to identify genetic defects, however, comes the dan-
ger that such information may be used to categorize or discriminate
against individuals. Employers who gain access to the genetic information
of job applicants or current employees have the power to base employ-
ment decisions upon the probability that the applicants or employees will
develop disabling genetic diseases.1 42 Concerned about productivity and
insurance costs, employers would be tempted to employ only those quali-
fied individuals who possess the most "normal" genetic codes.
The Americans with Disabilities Act was passed to end discrimination
against individuals with disabilities. 14 3 The legislative history of the ADA
reveals a settled purpose in the employment field: to give a qualified indi-
138. See id. § 206(b) ("An employer, employment agency, labor organization,
or joint labor management committee shall not disclose genetic information con-
cerning an employee or member.").
139. See id. § 206(b)(1)-(5) (listing circumstances in which disclosure of ge-
netic information is permitted).
140. See id. § 206(b) (6) (allowing disclosure of "a contagious disease that
presents an imminent hazard of death or life threatening illness" to "a Federal,
State, or local public health agency" if affected employees are also notified of
disclosure).
141. See National Human Genome Research Institute, supra note 19 (defining
genome and discussing impact of mapping entire human genome). For a discus-
sion of genes, chromosomes, and the human genome, as they relate to the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act, see supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text.
142. For an account of how employers can use genetic information to dis-
criminate against employees, see supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
143. For analysis concerning Congress's intent that the protections of the
ADA apply to individuals with genetic defects, see supra notes 31-43 and accompa-
nying text.
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vidual a fair chance to secure a meaningful job regardless of the individ-
ual's disability, as long as the individual can perform the essential
functions of the job. Despite the legislative history, the ADA itself and the
substantive regulations promulgated under the ADA by the EEOC leave
serious doubt as to whether the statute matches congressional intent when
it is applied to individuals with genetic defects. 144 Although the ADA
clearly applies to individuals with abnormal genetic traits and symptomatic
genetic diseases, it is uncertain whether asymptomatic individuals who
have or will have increased risks of contracting a genetic disease, or those
who merely carry genetic defects, meet the definition of disability under
the ADA.
In order to remedy this gap in protection, Congress passed the Ge-
netic Information Nondiscrimination Act.145 GINA protects from discrim-
ination individuals who have a genetic predisposition to contract or to
transmit by heredity impairments that substantially limit major life activi-
ties. In addition, GINA broadly defines "genetic information" in order to
encompass all aspects of individuals' genotypes.
Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act "to provide
clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing discrimination
against individuals." 146 Unfortunately, science surpassed the provisions of
that statute. Employers gained the ability to discriminate against qualified
individuals on the basis of their genetic information, at least until they
actually developed or passed on a debilitating genetic disease. Clearly, in
order to close this gap in coverage under the ADA, Congress used GINA to
further its original intent of eliminating discrimination against all disabled
individuals-including those whose disabilities are not easily perceived.
Though only the passage of time and future court decisions will reveal
how well this new legislation meets this goal, one hopes that justice for
individuals based upon their genetic code has finally been achieved. Sa-
rah can now undergo the genetic test for Huntington's disease, free from
fear that it could cost her her job and livelihood.
144. For a discussion of the ADA's inability to extend to several possible sce-
narios of genetic discrimination, see supra notes 44-88 and accompanying text.
145. For a comprehensive overview of GINA, including a discussion of the
goals pursued, and compromises made, by Congress through passage of the stat-
ute, see supra notes 89-140 and accompanying text.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2) (2006) (defining purposes of Americans with
Disabilities Act).
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